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A CRITIQUE OF THE ORTHODOX PATH TO 
ECONOMIC PROSPERITY 
W. Tyler Perry 
ABSTRACT—The dominant strain of law and development theory holds 
that strong property rights are a necessary condition for economic growth. 
Nonetheless, China has experienced thirty years of frenetic growth absent 
strong property rights. This Note explores this phenomenon through an 
analysis of a unique corporate form that has come to underlie most of the 
publicly traded Chinese Internet sector—the Variable Interest Entity (VIE). 
The VIE is, at its core, a series of contracts designed to mimic “true” 
ownership. As such, the VIE problematizes law and development theory in 
two primary ways. First, the contract-based ownership system does not 
provide the clean title envisioned by most law and development theorists, 
and consequently raises issues related to control. Second, the ownership 
claim of the investor is likely judicially unenforceable. Accordingly, the 
increasing prevalence of the VIE structure and the simultaneous economic 
growth enjoyed by China’s Internet sector naturally leads to a number of 
interrelated conclusions. First, the VIE shows that weak property rights 
may be sufficient in situations where they nonetheless provide notice of 
who “owns” the particular item at issue (i.e., it serves a title-clearing 
function). Second, culturally specific, extralegal institutions and methods 
may vindicate rights in the absence of the rule of law. Third, predictability, 
an implicit purpose of the property rights regime, may allow for economic 
growth absent strong property rights. Read together, these three 
conclusions suggest that the academy has taken a good idea—the almost 
universal emphasis of rule of law and property rights—and stretched it 
beyond the confines of its natural universe. 
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[P]roperty rights belong legally to individuals, but their real function 
is social, to benefit vast numbers of people who do not themselves 
exercise these rights.† 
INTRODUCTION 
Would you buy a house if the deed remained in someone else’s name? 
What if your right to live in it was exclusively contractual? What if your 
ability to earn money from its sale was the same? Would it change your 
mind if the underlying contracts were unenforceable? What if they were 
illegal? Consideration of the following example is illuminating.1 
On September 19, 2014, a bell rang and Alibaba went public.2 The 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) shattered the record books, valuing the 
company at over $200 billion,3 raising $25 billion in capital,4 and creating 
 
† SUSAN E. DUDLEY & JERRY BRITO, REGULATION: A PRIMER 101 (2d ed. 2012) (quoting Thomas 
Sowell, The “Takings” Issue, FORBES, Mar. 2, 1992, at 60). 
1 This example was inspired by an article written by Hernando de Soto. See Hernando de Soto, 
What if You Can’t Prove You Had a House?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/
2006/01/20/opinion/20iht-edsoto.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/U9X7-8CQ6]. 
2 Alibaba US IPO Launches on NYSE, CCTV AM. (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.cctv-
america.com/2014/09/19/alibaba-us-ipo-launches-on-nyse [http://perma.cc/YM7F-Y5J2]. 
3 Marcus Wohlsen, Alibaba Is Already Bigger than Facebook, Amazon, and IBM, WIRED (Sept. 19, 
2014, 2:33 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/09/alibaba-already-bigger-facebook-amazon-ibm/ 
[http://perma.cc/YS34-6RQT]. 
4 Liana B. Baker, Alibaba Issues Additional Shares To Raise IPO Total to $25 Billion: Report, 
REUTERS, Sept. 22, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/22/us-alibaba-ipo-
idUSKBN0HH04H20140922 [http://perma.cc/QD7U-PWDX]. 
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thousands of millionaires.5 It was an unequivocal financial success. On that 
day and every day since then, however, investors have not exchanged 
dollars for stock of Alibaba. Instead, they have purchased something far 
more amorphous—stock in a Cayman Islands entity that has contractual 
rights designed to mirror ownership of Alibaba without actually providing 
for it.6 In other words, investors bought the benefit of a contract, not a piece 
of a company. 
The Alibaba IPO and the increasing number of events like it raise 
serious questions about the dominant strain of law and development theory 
by questioning the core assumption that property rights are a necessary 
condition for economic development. Alibaba is listed through a structure 
called a variable interest entity (VIE). The VIE is, at its core, a series of 
contracts designed to mimic “true” ownership. The structure is a brilliant 
slight of hand calculated to circumvent strict regulations on the foreign 
ownership of Chinese companies located in sensitive industries. While 
certainly a relatively new phenomenon,7 it has grown exponentially in 
popularity such that today “[a]ll of China’s major Internet companies that 
list on U.S. exchanges use the VIE structure.”8 
The VIE structure works by utilizing two types of contracts: one set 
secures control of the company and the other secures a right to the 
economic benefit of the company. The actual mechanics of this are more 
complicated. First, a parent company is incorporated in a tax haven, often 
the Cayman Islands.9 The parent company then creates a Wholly Foreign 
 
5 Andrew Jacobs & Neil Gough, Alibaba IPO Creates Thousands of New Millionaires in China, 
BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/09/19/alibaba-ipo-creates-
thousands-new-millionaires-china/fOQ1xwIXJBY76kSVVJpEnJ/story.html [http://perma.cc/U2TF-
SSED]. 
6 Steven Davidoff Solomon, Alibaba Investors Will Buy a Risky Corporate Structure, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (May 6, 2014, 7:46 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/06/i-p-o-revives-debate-
over-a-chinese-structure/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/6K47-JS68] (“[Investors] 
will purchase shares in a Cayman Islands entity named Alibaba Group Holding Limited. . . . The 
Cayman Islands company has contractual rights to the profits of Alibaba China, but it has no economic 
interest.”).  
7 See Jing Li, Venture Capital Investments in China: The Use of Offshore Financing Structures and 
Corporate Relocations, 1 MICH. J. PRIV. EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 1, 47 (2012) (“Because the 
contractual control concept embodied in the VIE model was first tested successfully in the listing of 
Sina.com in NASDAQ in 2000, the VIE model is also often referred to as the ‘Sina model.’” (footnote 
omitted)). 
8 KEVIN ROSIER, U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, THE RISKS OF CHINA’S INTERNET 
COMPANIES ON U.S. STOCK EXCHANGES 3 (2014), http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
Research/The%20Risks%20of%20China%E2%80%99s%20Internet%20Companies%20on%20U.S.%2
0Stock%20Exchanges%20-%20with%20Addendum.pdf [http://perma.cc/GW6Y-BP9Q]. 
9 Ma Mengwei, The Perils and Prospects of China’s Variable Interest Entities: Unraveling the 
Murky Rules and the Institutional Challenges Posed, 43 H.K. L.J. 1061, 1063 (2013). 
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Owned Enterprise (WFOE) in China.10 Next, the WFOE enters into a series 
of contracts with the local Chinese target,11 the VIE, and the VIE’s 
owners.12 These contracts provide a right to any and all profits, and deliver 
a semblance of control. Generally, as discussed further below, the right to 
profits is secured through exclusive service and asset licensing agreements, 
while the right to control is ensured through a call option, an equity pledge, 
a voting rights, and a loan agreement.13 Cumulatively, these contracts allow 
for the VIE to be incorporated into the parent company’s accounting 
statements under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).14 It is 
important to note, however, that under this arrangement, all of the relevant 
assets and licenses remain in the hands of the Chinese owners—the 
investor simply does not own a part of the company.15 
In striking contrast to the economic boom in the Chinese technology 
space fostered through the proliferation of VIEs and their weak property 
rights, the dominant strain of law and development theory contends that 
property rights are a necessary condition for economic growth.16 In 
 
10 Id. 
11 For purposes of this Note, the “target” corporation is the local Chinese entity from which the 
foreign investor derives economic value. 
12 Ma Mengwei, supra note 9, at 1063. 
13 David Roberts & Thomas Hall, VIE Structures in China: What You Need to Know, TOPICS IN 
CHINESE L. (O’Melveny & Myers LLP, Beijing, China), Oct. 2011, at 2–3 (2011), http://iis-
db.stanford.edu/evnts/6963/TICL_-_VIE_Structures_in_China.pdf [http://perma.cc/SK85-BTCZ]. 
14 See generally PWC, ACCOUNTING FOR VARIABLE INTEREST ENTITIES 2013 (2d ed. 2015), 
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/cfodirect/assets/pdf/accounting-guides/pwc-guide-variable-interest-entities-
second-edition-2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/9LVG-P3GJ] (describing the treatment of VIEs under 
GAAP). 
15 At this point, it is important to briefly note the divergence between the legal and lay 
understandings of ownership. The lay understanding of property rights contends that an individual can, 
and often does, “own” property free and clear of any external encumbrance. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, 
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 26 (1977) (“I think it fair to say that one of the main 
points of the first-year Property course is to disabuse entering law students of their primitive lay notions 
regarding ownership. They learn that only the ignorant think it meaningful to talk about owning things 
free and clear of further obligation.”). The common legal understanding of ownership recognizes that 
ownership is better conceptualized as “the relationships that arise between people with respect to 
things.” Id. Accordingly, property is often referred to as a “bundle of sticks,” allowing individuals to 
choose and trade rights as they see fit. See, e.g., Anna di Robilant, Property: A Bundle of Sticks or a 
Tree?, 66 VAND. L. REV. 869, 871 (2013) (“In the United States, every first-year law student learns that 
property is a ‘bundle of sticks.’ Introduced by Hohfeld, and further developed by the realists, the bundle 
of sticks concept characterizes property as a bundle of entitlements regulating relations among persons 
concerning a valued resource.”). Thus, when I say that VIE investors do not “own” the company in 
which they invest, I mean that they possess a very limited number of rights (or sticks), which 
consequently heavily circumscribes their ability to control the object vis-à-vis other social actors. 
Additionally, the rights that they do have are fairly weak. 
16 See, e.g., Frank K. Upham, From Demsetz to Deng: Speculations on the Implications of Chinese 
Growth for Law and Development Theory, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 551, 557 (2009) (“Property 
rights are at the heart of the incentive structure of market economies. They determine who bears risk 
and who gains or loses from transactions. In so doing they spur worthwhile investment, encourage 
careful monitoring and supervision, promote work effort, and create a constituency for enforceable 
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particular, the academy has come to believe that “[p]roperty rights 
encourage productive activity by allowing people to reap the rewards of 
their labor,” creating growth.17 A more nuanced conception contends that 
“[l]egally created titles and stock certificates generate investment; clear 
property records guarantee credit; documents allow people to be identified 
and helped; company statutes . . . pool resources for recovery; mortgages 
raise money; [and] contracts solidify commitments.”18 It is beautifully 
simple, and has worked in a number of instances.19 Most importantly, 
however, it has achieved near universal support.20  
But, as with all great theories, cracks are beginning to appear in law 
and development dogma. As of yet, these cracks are the result of a series of 
attempts to determine the exact nature of the relationship between property 
rights and economic development.21 Within this increasingly fractured 
debate, many scholars still offer wholehearted support for law and 
development dogma.22 Others have advocated a more nuanced 
interpretation.23 I hope to add to this growing discussion. To that end, my 
geographic focus will be China and my illustrative example will be the 
VIE. 
 
contracts. In short, fully specified property rights reward effort and good judgment, thereby assisting 
economic growth and wealth creation.” (quoting WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1996: 
FROM PLAN TO MARKET 48–49 (1996))); see also Larissa Katz, Governing Through Owners: How and 
Why Formal Private Property Rights Enhance State Power, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2029, 2058 n.88 (2012) 
(“[L]egal protection of property rights creates incentives to exploit resources efficiently.” (alteration in 
original) (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 32 (6th ed. 2003))). 
17 Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Primacy of Society and the Failures of Law and Development, 
44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 209, 226 (2011). 
18 de Soto, supra note 1. 
19 See, e.g., Jeremy Clift, Hearing the Dogs Bark: Jeremy Clift Interviews Development Guru 
Hernando de Soto, FIN. & DEV., Dec. 2003, at 8, 8, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2003/
12/pdf/people.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZPL7-LATJ] (“In the early 1990s, [de Soto’s] proposed [property] 
reforms were credited with turning people in Peru against the Shining Path Maoist guerillas . . . .”). 
20 Order in the Jungle, ECONOMIST (Mar. 13, 2008), http://www.economist.com/node/10849115 
[http://perma.cc/8HKR-ALL2] (“No other single political ideal has ever achieved global 
endorsement.”); see also Michael Trebilcock & Paul-Erik Veel, Property Rights and Development: The 
Contingent Case for Formalization, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 397, 399 (2008) (“[I]t has become 
conventional wisdom . . . that, whatever else the state does, it should provide effective institutions and 
processes to protect private property rights and enforce contracts, which are regarded as pre-requisites 
to efficient and dynamic market economies.”). 
21 See, e.g., Trebilcock & Veel, supra 20, at 478. 
22 See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE 
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 5–7 (2000). 
23 See, e.g., Donald C. Clarke, Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis: The China 
Problem, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 89, 111 (2003) (“[I]t would be profoundly misleading to view the real 
barrier to economic development in such a society as the lack of an effective formal legal system.”); see 
also Samuli Seppänen, Ideological Renewal and Nostalgia in China’s “Avant-Garde” Legal 
Scholarship, 13 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 83 (2014) (discussing efforts to develop alternatives 
to law and development dogma). 
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This Note will argue that the VIE provides a natural foil to those who 
dogmatically believe that strong property rights are a necessary condition 
for economic growth while additionally helping to locate and analyze the 
theory’s primary inflection points. Accordingly, my analysis will progress 
in four parts. First, I will provide a detailed description of the VIE 
structure, outline the example of Alibaba, and explore how that example 
presents issues for true believers in the correlation between property rights 
and economic development. Part II will present an explanation of the 
property rights and economic growth nexus, the “Property Rights Nexus.” 
Part III will analyze the effects of documented ownership, culture, and 
predictability on the Property Rights Nexus. Finally, Part IV will present a 
few closing implications and will qualify my analysis. A brief conclusion 
will follow. Through my examination, I hope to show that the orthodox 
view of property rights as a tool of economic development is far too rigid; 
simultaneously, I suggest that China’s recent growth presents a unique 
locus for further study. 
I. THE VIE AS A POTENTIAL FOIL 
Years ago, we here at China Law Blog made clear our views on VIEs 
and nothing about those views has changed. . . . In a nutshell, we don’t 
like them, don’t trust them, and don’t do them.‡ 
China is a problematic example for true believers in the Property 
Rights Nexus. Today in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), both the 
rule of law generally, and property rights specifically, are weak; but China 
has nonetheless experienced thirty years of sustained, frenetic growth.24 
Against this background, the VIE presents clear evidence in support of the 
basic assertion that property rights, at least in their pure form, are not a 
necessary condition for growth. This Section will proceed in three parts. 
First, it will explain the VIE and its origins. Second, it will outline the 
recent example of Alibaba. Finally, it will analyze the problems VIEs pose 
for the Property Rights Nexus. 
A. The General VIE Structure 
At its core, the VIE is a contractual relationship. Foreign investors buy 
stock in a company that has an agreement with the target business in China. 
This arrangement promises a share of the profits earned by the target. The 
 
‡ Dan Harris, Buying into a China VIE. What Me Worry?, CHINA L. BLOG (June 17, 2013), 
http://www.chinalawblog.com/2013/06/buying-into-a-china-vie-what-me-worry.html 
[http://perma.cc/QT4Z-4X7Q]. 
24 Jane Haltmaier, Challenges for the Future of Chinese Economic Growth 1 (Bd. of Governors of 
the Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Finance Discussion Paper No. 1072, 2013). 
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Chinese company receives capital and the foreign investors make money. 
All parties are satisfied. 
The origin of the VIE is generally traced to the IPO of Sina.com in 
2000.25 In the years since, it has grown exponentially in popularity such 
that today, “[a]ll of China’s major Internet companies that list on U.S. 
exchanges use the VIE structure.”26 The list reads like a roster of China’s 
biggest and best companies: Sina.com, Baidu, Tencent, and Alibaba.27 They 
are the dominant players in China’s emerging economy and have the 
associated political and social connections that one would expect.28 
However, prior to the development of the VIE structure, this notable group 
consistently lacked a means of financing their continued growth. 
The reasons for this are largely institutional. Traditionally, companies 
have three primary means of securing financing: (1) accepting bank 
financing, (2) entering debt capital markets, or (3) entering equity capital 
markets. In China, each is problematic. First, Chinese banks will not lend 
because of ideological considerations and government restrictions.29 
Second, the local Chinese stock exchanges are poorly developed, and were 
designed primarily to restructure state-owned enterprises.30 Moreover, it is 
almost impossible for Chinese companies to receive permission to list in 
foreign markets,31 and foreign investors are prohibited from owning 
majority stakes in companies that implicate national security (e.g., Internet 
companies).32 As a result, the VIE structure has become a convenient, and 
perhaps necessary, method of circumventing the restrictions—both 
practical and regulatory—that hamper the growth of Chinese companies by 
 
25 Li, supra note 7, at 47. 
26 ROSIER, supra note 8, at 3. 
27 See Sue-Lin Wong, China Court Ruling Could Threaten Foreign Investments in Country, N.Y. 
TIMES: IHT RENDEZVOUS (June 17, 2013, 3:09 AM), http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/17/
china-court-ruling-could-threaten-some-foreign-invested-companies/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 
[http://perma.cc/VHU4-NCRP]. 
28 See, e.g., Teddy Ng & Cary Huang, Xi Jinping Arrives in Seoul with Huge Business Delegation 
as Beijing Aims to Boost Trade Ties, S. CHINA MORNING POST (July 3, 2014, 8:32 PM), 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1545181/huge-business-delegation-accompanies-xi-jinping-
seoul [http://perma.cc/S9Y4-W4RR] (discussing a Chinese trade delegation sent to South Korea that 
included many prominent technology CEOs). 
29 Ma Mengwei, supra note 9, at 1064–65 (“Banks in China usually lack incentives to lend to 
private enterprises as a result of ideological concerns and government interference in bank 
lending . . . .”). 
30 Id. at 1065. 
31 See ROSIER, supra note 8, at 2. 
32 Dan Harris, VIEs in China. The End of a Flawed Strategy., CHINA L. BLOG (Oct. 10, 2011), 
http://www.chinalawblog.com/2011/10/vies_in_china_the_end_of_a_flawed_strategy.html 
[https://perma.cc/P3TF-MQJR]. 
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connecting the willing foreign investor with a willing Chinese investment 
target.33  
1. Financial Benefit.—The actual mechanics of the VIE process are 
somewhat more complicated. First, a parent company is incorporated in a 
tax haven, often the Cayman Islands.34 The parent company then creates a 
WFOE35 in China to act as a conduit between the tax-haven entity and the 
Chinese target.36 Next, the WFOE enters into a series of contracts.37 These 
contracts provide the WFOE, and the associated foreign investor, a right to 
substantially all profits and a semblance of control.38 The former goal is 
achieved through two individual contracts: an “exclusive service 
agreement” and an “asset licensing agreement,” both of which are between 
the WFOE and the VIE.39 The exclusive service agreement traditionally 
allows for the “WFOE [to provide] certain services to the VIE for a fee, 
[which is] typically determined by the WFOE with the intended result of 
shifting the VIE’s operating profits to the WFOE. The scope of service 
varies depending on the industry, but typically includes consulting or 
 
33 While this may seem like a fairly broad statement, there is ample support for its core contention 
that growth capital is extremely difficult to obtain for many Chinese companies. See, e.g., Neil Gregory 
& Stoyan Tenev, The Financing of Private Enterprise in China, FIN. & DEV., Mar. 2001, at 14, 14, 
(“Despite its growing importance, at the end of 1999, the private sector accounted for only 1 percent of 
bank lending, and only 1 percent of the companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges were nonstate firms. The discrepancy between the dynamism of the private sector and its 
limited use of intermediated financing suggests that the private sector may not be able to sustain its 
current rate of growth unless it can increase its access to financing.”). This problem continues to the 
present day. See Paul L. Gillis, Accounting Matters: Variable Interest Entities in China, GUEST SERIES 
(Forensic Asia, Hong Kong, China), Sept. 18, 2012, at 1, http://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/vie-
2012septaccountingmatte.pdf [http://perma.cc/GD7T-GXB4] (“Private companies in China have had 
difficulty in getting access to capital and have looked to foreign investors as a source of funds. 
Unfortunately, Chinese companies need permission to list overseas and foreign companies are restricted 
from operating in certain domestic sectors.”); see also ROSIER, supra note 8, at 2 (“As China’s leading 
Internet companies expand, they are unable to obtain sufficient capital domestically and are turning to 
foreign investors by listing on non-Chinese exchanges, most commonly in the United States.”). 
34 Ma Mengwei, supra note 9, at 1063. 
35 To understand the adoption of this investment structure, a bit of background is necessary. 
Generally, there are two primary means of foreign direct investment: mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
and greenfield investments. Hui Huang, The Regulation of Foreign Investment in Post-WTO China: A 
Political Economy Analysis, 23 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 185, 187 (2009). Traditionally, M&A has been 
disfavored as a means of investing in China, causing greenfield investments to emerge as the most 
prominent form of investment. See id. at 187–88. Greenfield investments refer to investment through 
the creation of a new company. Kevin C. Kennedy, A WTO Agreement on Investment: A Solution in 
Search of a Problem?, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 77, 79 n.5 (2003). Within the range of greenfield 
investments, WFOEs have emerged as a popular structure, and exist in contrast to other forms of 
greenfield investment, such as joint ventures, in that they are controlled exclusively by the foreign 
investor. Huang, supra, at 196. 
36 Ma Mengwei, supra note 9, at 1063. 
37 Id. 
38 Roberts & Hall, supra note 13, at 2–3. 
39 Id. at 3. 
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strategic services and technical services.”40 For example, the Chinese VIE 
Weibo structured its exclusive service agreement such that the WFOE 
provided distribution, sale, agency, and technical support services in 
exchange for substantially all of the economic benefit of the VIE.41  
The asset licensing agreement serves a similar purpose as “the WFOE 
licenses certain assets, typically including intellectual property, to the VIE 
for royalty fees . . . [and] usually allows the WFOE to terminate the license 
at any time.”42 Accordingly, the WFOE secures “additional control over the 
VIE if operation of the VIE relies on the assets that are the subject of the 
license.”43 Returning to the example of Weibo mentioned above, the asset 
licensing agreement in that structure provides that the WFOE licensed 
trademarks in exchange for $79.2 million in 2013.44 
2. Effective Control.—Effective control is usually achieved through 
four contracts entered into between the WFOE and the primary (local 
Chinese) shareholders of the VIE.45 They include (1) a “call option 
agreement,” (2) an “equity pledge agreement,” (3) a “voting rights 
agreement,” and (4) a “loan agreement.”46 The call option agreement allows 
“the VIE’s shareholders [to] grant an option for the WFOE or the WFOE’s 
designee to purchase all or a portion of their equity interest in the VIE 
through one or a series of transactions.”47 This provides a contractual 
mechanism for seizing control if the VIE equity holders fail to live up to 
their side of the bargain.48 In other words, if the VIE equity holders violate 
their agreements, then the investor can seize the VIE equity holders’ shares, 
taking control of the company. 
The equity pledge agreement requires “the VIE’s shareholders [to] 
pledge their equity interest in the VIE to the WFOE as a guarantee of the 
performance of their and the VIE’s obligations under other VIE structure 
agreements.”49 Again, this provides the WFOE with security by threatening 
 
40 Id. 
41 While there were actually multiple agreements, their cumulative effect is the same as if they 
were a single document. See Weibo Corp., Amendment No. 3 to Form F-1 Registration Statement under 
the Securities Act of 1933 (Form F-1), at 69 (Apr. 14, 2014) [hereinafter Weibo]. 
42 Roberts & Hall, supra note 13, at 3. 
43 Id. 
44 In this particular instance, the agreement was referred to as a “trademark license agreement.” 
Weibo, supra note 41, at 69. 
45 Roberts & Hall, supra note 13, at 2. The primary shareholder is usually a company insider, and 
often the founder. Id. 
46 Id. at 2–3. 
47 Id. at 2. 
48 See id. 
49 Id. 
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the VIE equity holders with possible forfeiture of their shares should they 
violate the agreement. 
Under the voting rights agreement “the VIE’s shareholders delegate 
their shareholder rights, including voting rights, inspection/information 
rights, signing rights and election rights, to the designee of the WFOE.”50 
The agreement thus provides the investor with all of the political rights51 
associated with traditional ownership, further securing the investment. 
Finally, the loan agreement grants “a loan to the shareholder to use for 
capitalization of the VIE. The loan agreement typically includes stringent 
covenants, limits on repayment methods and acceleration clauses designed 
to help in enforcing the VIE structure as a whole.”52 This agreement both 
capitalizes the VIE and provides an additional, final layer of control. 
While the VIE contracts discussed above may appear to provide 
investors with adequate control—at least in comparison to a traditional 
investment—under a VIE arrangement, all of the relevant assets and 
licensing remain legal property of the Chinese VIE. Thus, as discussed 
further below, it is an investment structure that requires a tremendous 
amount of faith, understanding, goodwill, and, most importantly, luck. The 
contours of the structure are outlined in Figure 1 below. 
  
 
50 Id. at 3. 
51 By political rights I mean the noneconomic rights that an investor traditionally receives, such as 
the ability to vote and accordingly exert control. 
52 Roberts & Hall, supra note 13, at 3. 
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B. The Example of Alibaba 
An examination of the structure used by Alibaba in its September 
2014 IPO is both clarifying and illuminating. As background, Alibaba is 
“the largest online and mobile commerce company in the world in terms of 
gross merchandise volume.”54 For all intents and purposes, it is an 
ecosystem of online wizardry, encompassing a Chinese eBay, Amazon, 
PayPal, Twitter, and YouTube.55 It is also a clear example of the use of a 
VIE as a listing mechanism, the mechanics of which are explained below. 
As a preliminary matter, it is helpful to understand the relevant 
players. The company ultimately listed in the United States is a Cayman 
Islands entity called Alibaba Group Holding Limited. Through a series of 
subsidiary entities, five WFOEs were created in China, including (1) 
Taobao (China) Software Co., Ltd., (2) Zhejiang Tmall Technology Co., 
Ltd., (3) Hangzhou Alimama Technology Co., Ltd., (4) Alibaba (China) 
Technology Co., Ltd., and (5) Alisoft (Shanghai) Co., Ltd.56 The five 
WFOEs corresponded to five VIEs, which were (1) Zhejiang Taobao 
Network Co., Ltd., (2) Zhejiang Tmall Network Co., Ltd., (3) Hangzhou 
 
53 Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd., Prospectus (Form 424(b)(4)), at 90 (Sept. 18, 2014) [hereinafter 
Alibaba Prospectus]. 
54 Id. at 1. 
55 Chris Wright, So What Exactly Is Alibaba?, FORBES (Sept. 16, 2014, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chriswright/2014/09/16/so-what-exactly-is-alibaba/ [http://perma.cc/Y3AJ-
SVPZ] (“On top of its core sites it owns alipay.com, a Chinese equivalent of Paypal; and has large 
stakes in Sina Weibo, China’s version of Twitter; and Youku Tudou, the closest Chinese equivalent to 
YouTube.”). 
56 Alibaba Prospectus, supra note 53, at 88, 90. 
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Ali Technology Co. Ltd., (4) Hangzhou Alibaba Advertising Co., Ltd., and 
(5) Alibaba Cloud Computing Ltd.57 The equity owners of all the VIEs are 
Jack Ma, Alibaba’s founder, and Simon Xie, a trusted colleague.58 The 
following chart provides a brief summary of the relevant corporate entities. 
TABLE 159: 
WFOE VIE Nature of Business 
Taobao (China) Software 
Co., Ltd. 
Zhejiang Taobao Network 
Co., Ltd. 
Offers an online consumer-to-
consumer marketplace.60 
Zhejiang Tmall 
Technology Co., Ltd. 
Zhejiang Tmall Network 
Co., Ltd. 
Provides a “third-party 
platform for brands and 
retailers.”61 
Hangzhou Alimama 
Technology Co., Ltd. 
Hangzhou Ali Technology 
Co. Ltd. 
Offers a “marketing 
technology platform, which 
provides . . . marketing 
services including valuable 
data insights.”62 
Alibaba (China) 
Technology Co., Ltd. 
 
Hangzhou Alibaba 
Advertising Co., Ltd. 
Provide services primarily 
related to “the operations of 
[Alibaba’s] wholesale 
marketplaces.”63 
Alisoft (Shanghai) Co., 
Ltd. 
Alibaba Cloud Computing 
Ltd. 
“[O]ffers a complete suite of 
cloud computing services, 
including elastic computing, 
database services and storage 
and large scale computing 
services for our platforms and 
the platforms of companies 
integral to [Alibaba’s] 
ecosystem.”64 
 
The WFOEs traditionally enter into a series of contracts both with the 
VIE and with the primary equity owners of the VIE in order to gain 
effective control and receive substantially all economic benefit from the 
 
57 Id. at 88–89. 
58 The shares are divided between Ma and Xie on an 80–20 split. Id. at 89. The only exception is 
Zhejiang Taobao Network Co., Ltd., which has a 90–10 split between Ma and Xie. Id. 
59 See id. at 88. 
60 Id. at 86. 
61 Id. at 1. 
62 Id. at 161. 
63 Id. at F-39. 
64 Id. at 103. 
PERRY (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/2016 12:22 PM 
110:477 (2016) Development and Distrust 
489 
organization. Alibaba is no different. Here, investor control is secured 
through the typical four contracts: (1) a loan agreement,65 (2) an exclusive 
call option agreement,66 (3) a proxy agreement,67 and (4) an equity pledge 
agreement.68 “The parties to the . . . agreement[s] . . . are Jack Ma and 
Simon Xie on the one hand, and . . . the respective [WFOEs] on the other 
hand.”69 These contracts differ from the benefit contracts, discussed below, 
in that they are between the WFOE and the VIE equity holders. 
The ability to receive substantially all economic benefit is secured 
through Exclusive Technical Services Agreements. The parties to these 
agreements, unlike the control contracts, are the VIEs and the WFOEs. The 
agreements specifically require that: 
[T]he relevant [WFOE] provides exclusive technical services to the [VIE]. In 
exchange, the [VIE] pays a service fee to the [WFOE] which typically 
amount[s] to what would be substantially all of the [VIE’s] pre-tax profit 
(absent the service fee), resulting in a transfer of substantially all of the profits 
from the [VIE] to the [WFOE].70 
Thus, profits are shuttled from the heavily regulated VIE to the less 
regulated WFOE, without technically violating Chinese regulations. An 
illustrative diagram is below. 
  
 
65 According to this contract, the relevant WFOEs have “granted an interest-free loan to the 
relevant [VIE] equity holders, which may only be used for the purpose of a capital contribution to the 
relevant [VIE] or as may be otherwise agreed by the [WFOE].” Id. at 90. 
66 This agreement grants “the [WFOE] an exclusive call option to purchase their equity interest in 
the [VIE] at an exercise price equal to the higher of (i) the registered capital in the [VIE]; and (ii) the 
minimum price as permitted by applicable PRC laws. Each relevant [VIE] has further granted the 
relevant [WFOE] an exclusive call option to purchase its assets at an exercise price . . . .” Id. 
67 This contract “irrevocably authorizes any person designated by the [WFOE] to exercise his rights 
as an equity holder of the [VIE], including the right to attend and vote at equity holders’ meetings and 
appoint directors.” Id. at 91. 
68 According to this contract, “the relevant [VIE] equity holders have pledged all of their interests 
in the equity of the [VIE] as a continuing first priority security interest in favor of the [WFOE] to secure 
the outstanding amounts advanced under the relevant loan agreements described above and to secure 
the performance of obligations by the [VIE] and/or its equity holders under the other structure 
contracts.” Id. 
69 Id. at 90. The WFOEs include Taobao (China) Software Co., Ltd.; Zhejiang Tmall Technology 
Co., Ltd.; Hangzhou Alimama Technology Co., Ltd.; Alibaba (China) Technology Co., Ltd.; and 
Alisoft (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. Id. 
70 Id. at 91. 
PERRY (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/2016 12:22 PM 




The above system of contracts “collectively enable[s investors] to 
exercise effective control over the [VIEs] and realize substantially all of the 
economic risks and benefits arising from [them].”72 Interestingly, if not 
troublingly, Alibaba uses this system to “generate the significant majority 
of [its] revenue directly through [their WFOEs], which directly capture the 
profits and associated cash flow from operations.”73 That is to say, the 
economic value of the company launched in September 2015 is tied up in 
contractually-based control and benefit rights that dramatically differ from 
traditional ownership. Moreover, this arrangement is further problematized, 
as discussed below, by the possible unenforceability of the underlying 
contracts.74 
C. The VIE and Development Dogma 
The VIE structure presents a direct challenge to the Property Rights 
Nexus. It does so in two ways. First, the contract-based ownership system 
does not provide the clean title envisioned by most law and development 
theorists, and consequently raises issues related to control. Second, the 
ownership claim of the investor is likely judicially unenforceable. 
1. Inability to Control.—Control rights are implicated in two ways. 
The first is present in all VIE relationships, while the second need not 
necessarily be so. Both, particularly when read together, raise serious 
questions about the ability of the investor to exercise control. 
 
71 Id. at 90. 
72 Id. at 89. 
73 Id. 
74 See infra Section I.C.2. 
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First, investors maintain effective control of the various VIEs through 
a series of four contracts.75 Naturally, the effectiveness of the investor’s 
control right is dependent on the cooperation of the equity holders. 
Returning to the example of Alibaba, the risks of this structure become 
immediately apparent. As explained in the company’s IPO Prospectus, 
“[t]hese contractual arrangements may not be as effective as direct 
ownership in providing us with control over our [VIEs].”76 According to 
the proxy agreement, the investor has the right to appoint the directors, 
providing the appearance of true ownership with the added caveat of a 
middleman.77 However, because of this middleman, “[u]nder [the] 
contractual arrangements, [the investor] may not be able to directly change 
the members of the boards of directors . . . and would have to rely on the 
[VIEs] and the [VIE] equity holders to perform their obligations in order to 
exercise our control over the [VIEs].”78 This type of issue is likely to occur 
in situations where “[t]he variable interest entity equity holders . . . have 
conflicts of interest with . . . shareholders, and . . . [do] not act in the best 
interests of [the] company or [do] not perform their obligations under these 
contracts.”79 Simply put, the “[VIEs] and their respective equity holders 
could breach their contractual arrangements with [the company] by . . . 
failing to conduct their operations . . . or taking other actions that are 
detrimental to [the company’s] interests.”80 The incentives for doing so 
could range from regulatory, as discussed below, to more illicit conduct.81 
As a result, the level of control, and the security of that control, is 
dependent on the cooperation of the equity-holding middleman.82 
Second, according to the articles of association of Alibaba Group 
Holdings Limited (the Cayman Islands entity), a partnership of insiders, 
 
75 See supra Sections I.A–B. 
76 See Alibaba Prospectus, supra note 53, at 50. 
77 See id. at 91. Specifically, the VIE equity holders, Jack Ma and Simon Xie, have authorized any 
person chosen by the WFOE to exercise their rights to attend and vote at equity meetings and to appoint 
directors. Id. The VIE equity holders could, however, become obstructionist by simply appearing at 
meetings and attempting to exercise their voting and appointment rights as if the proxy agreement did 
not exist. Understanding the difficulty of enforcing these contracts in Chinese courts, it is a relationship 
that accordingly requires the cooperation of the VIE equity holder. 
78 Id. at 50. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. A recent example of this issue is that of Yahoo! and Alipay discussed below in Section I.C.2, 
where substantial assets were transferred in violation of the VIE contracts. 
81 For a general discussion of the dangers of investing in Chinese companies, including VIEs, see 
Nancy A. Peterman et al., Recovering Assets in China: Practicalities and Pitfalls, CLIENT ADVISORY 
(Greenberg Traurig LLP, Chicago, Ill.), Aug. 2014, http://www.gtlaw.com/News-Events/Publications/
Published-Articles/178831/Recovering-Assets-in-China-Practicalities-and-Pitfalls 
[http://perma.cc/WZQ4-U7NL] (follow “View Media” hyperlink). 
82 See supra Section I.A.2. 
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referred to as the Alibaba Partnership, will have the right to nominate a 
majority of the board of directors.83 Accordingly, “the Alibaba Partnership 
will forever control the board, regardless of the size of the stake held by the 
Partnership’s members.”84 The Alibaba investor will consequently never be 
able to gain control of the company, and as a result, enjoys a very weak 
ownership right. 
2. Judicially Unenforceable.—Complicating the control issue is the 
difficulty of enforcing the underlying VIE contracts in Chinese courts if a 
violation were to occur.85 In particular, there is tremendous amount of 
ambiguity surrounding the VIE’s legality and a healthy level of skepticism 
as to the objectivity of the Chinese judicial system. 
As a preliminary matter, Chinese law prohibits foreign investors from 
owning a controlling stake in companies involved in certain sensitive 
industries.86 The technology space is one such industry. This clear legal rule 
is complicated, however, by two competing forces: (1) judicial dismissal of 
the VIE contracts as unenforceable and (2) wide-spread toleration of the 
VIE structure. 
The clearest, and perhaps most damning, example of judicial dismissal 
of the VIE contracts as unenforceable is the 2012 case of Chinachem 
Financial Services. The facts were simple. Nina Wang, Asia’s richest 
woman and a Hong Kong resident,87 sought to buy a stake in China 
Minsheng Banking Corporation.88 Banking, like the Internet sector, is a 
heavily regulated space and direct foreign ownership is discouraged by 
 
83 Alibaba Prospectus, supra note 53, at 230. 
84 Lucian Bebchuk, Alibaba’s Governance Leaves Investors at a Disadvantage, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (Sept. 16, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/alibabas-governance-
leaves-investors-at-a-disadvantage/?_r=1 [http://perma.cc/MV4U-SFM2. 
85 The importance of Chinese courts as an enforcement venue is rooted in the fact that the contracts 
are between three parties: the WFOE, the VIE, and the VIE equity holders, all of whom reside in China. 
See ROSIER, supra note 8, at 5. Moreover, pursuing the enforcement of Chinese contracts abroad has 
proven consistently ineffective. See Steve Dickinson, The Three Rules for Your China Contract, CHINA 
L. BLOG (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.chinalawblog.com/2013/04/the-three-rules-for-your-china-
contract.html [http://perma.cc/A4NX-LNB3] (“Chinese courts will not enforce US court judgments. 
Thus, any judgment obtained in a US court cannot be enforced in China. If the Chinese party has no 
assets located in the United States, the judgment is effectively worthless.”). 
86 The current list of sensitive industries includes “[n]ew-generation information technology, high-
end equipment manufacturing, advanced materials, alternative-fuel cars, energy conservation and 
environmental protection, alternative energy, and biotechnology.” U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW 
COMM’N, 2011 REPORT TO CONGRESS 91 (2011), http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
annual_reports/annual_report_full_11.pdf [http://perma.cc/4GXU-WUHS]. 
87 While Hong Kong is a part of China, Hong Kong residents are considered foreign for purposes 
of investment. See Neil Gough, In China, Concern About a Chill on Foreign Investments, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (June 2, 2013, 2:15 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/in-china-concern-of-a-
chill-on-foreign-investments/?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/KVK7-8ZJ7]. 
88 Id. 
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China’s regulatory regime.89 Accordingly, Ms. Wang instead used a 
number of contracts to gain control of the bank90 in a way that mirrored in 
function, but not form, the current VIE structure.91 Specifically, “Ms. 
Wang’s Hong Kong company, Chinachem Financial Services, used a series 
of contracts to effectively gain economic control over a mainland Chinese 
firm, which in turn acted as a proxy to buy and hold the stake in the new 
bank, the China Minsheng Banking Corporation.”92 
Chinachem and Ms. Wang soon developed friction over the ownership 
and dividends of bank shares, and litigation ensued.93 Ms. Wang lost. In 
handing down an adverse judgment, the Supreme People’s Court, the 
highest judicial body in China, found that the investment structure had 
“conceal[ed] illegal intentions with a lawful form.”94 That is to say, 
ownership structures intended to avoid Chinese regulation were inherently 
illegal. More relevant to the question at hand, the court’s holding appeared 
to implicate the VIE—a structure specifically designed to circumvent 
Chinese regulation—and leave it dead in the water. 
In addition to the Chinachem case, there have been further indicators 
of hostility to the VIE. Most notably, in 2011 Shanghai’s arbitration board95 
invalidated the VIE investment structure of a gaming company, 
GigaMedia, finding the company guilty of concealing “illegal intentions 
with a lawful form.”96 Read broadly and recognizing the politicized nature 




91 See id. (“The loopholes used by foreign investors in China, and by Chinese companies seeking to 
list on overseas stock markets, have become more sophisticated since Ms. Wang made her play for the 
stake in Minsheng bank.”). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Shai Oster & Dune Lawrence, Baidu Forced to Add Warnings as Regulators Focus on China 
Stocks, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 15, 2013, 4:27 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-15/baidu-
forced-to-add-warnings-as-regulators-focus-on-china-stocks.html [http://perma.cc/5ZPJ-XE2T]. 
95 While China follows a civil law system in which precedent is not binding, the court system, the 
Communist Party, and the state are so intertwined that a decision by one can be, and is often, viewed as 
an informed decision by all. See Benedict Sheehy, Fundamentally Conflicting Views of the Rule of Law 
in China and the West & Implications for Commercial Disputes, 26 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 225, 234 
(2006) (“In China, the CCP, the government, and the people’s will are one—at least according to the 
official view. Therefore, they exist simply as a unified whole and not merely as a collection of three 
independent parties or interests forced together.”); see also Donald C. Clarke, The Chinese Legal 
System (July 4, 2005), http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/dclarke/public/ChineseLegalSystem.html 
[http://perma.cc/9W6K-BGC6] (“As it rejects the notion of vertical separation of powers, the PRC also 
rejects the notion of horizontal separation of powers between different branches of government (for 
example, the traditional troika of legislative, executive, and judicial branches).”). 
96 Charles Comey et al., China VIEs: Recent Developments and Observations, CLIENT ALERT 
(Morrison & Foerster LLP, San Francisco, Cal.) Apr. 13, 2013, http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/
Images/130716-Variable-Interest-Entities-China.pdf [http://perma.cc/UZC5-WVXA]. 
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the VIE was no longer a viable investment structure—and yet, as discussed 
below, money continues to flow into VIEs and economic growth continues. 
Further complicating this situation are examples of soft regulation, in 
which the regulatory enforcement is overtly suggested but never explicitly 
pursued. The most famous example of this issue is the 2011 Alipay dispute 
between Alibaba and Yahoo!. The episode began in 2005 when Yahoo! 
acquired a 40% stake in Alibaba for $1 billion.97 The relationship prospered 
until 2011 when Alibaba unilaterally announced that it had restructured 
itself, handing 100% of Alipay, one of the company’s most valuable assets, 
to a Chinese domestic company.98 The move was prompted by a fax from 
the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) asking Alipay to declare if it had a 
VIE relationship with any overseas entities.99 The fax was prompted by a 
series of new regulatory systems implemented by the PBOC, which 
required nonfinancial institutions that provide payment services to apply 
for and receive a payment service license.100 “This fax implicitly indicated 
that Alipay’s application would not be accepted unless it [was] a pure 
Chinese-owned company without any VIE type of arrangement.”101 Left 
with no choice but compliance, the company transferred Alipay to another 
Jack Ma controlled entity.102 Yahoo! and Alibaba eventually settled out of 
court.103 
Having explained the unenforceability of the VIE contracts, the 
widespread toleration of the VIE form is as easy to demonstrate as it is 
deceptive. Today there are approximately 100 Chinese technology 
companies that use the VIE structure.104 Not only does the Chinese 
government allow VIEs to exist, but with Alibaba’s recent IPO, it has 
allowed them to grow in number and include one of the premier Chinese 
technology brands. The strength of this observation increases when one 
considers the chronology of Alibaba’s IPO relative to Chinachem. The 
Chinachem decision was handed down in 2012,105 yet Alibaba went public 
 
97 Yahoo Buys US $1 Billion Stake in Alibaba, CHINADAILY (updated Aug. 11, 2005, 10:01 PM), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-08/11/content_468252.htm [http://perma.cc/PXT6-
M8JG]; see also John Foley, Yahoo’s Alibaba Problem, FORTUNE (July 31, 2013, 6:16 PM), 
http://fortune.com/2013/07/31/yahoos-alibaba-problem/ [http://perma.cc/RQQ6-W33Q]. 
98 See Shen Wei, Will the Door Open Wider in the Aftermath of Alibaba?—Placing (or 
Misplacing) Foreign Investment in a Chinese Public Law Frame, 42 H.K. L.J. 561, 562 (2012). 
99 Id. at 563. 
100 See id. at 577. 
101 Id. at 563. 
102 Id. at 564. 
103 Id. 
104 See Gough, supra note 87. 
105 Oster & Lawrence, supra note 94. 
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in September 2014 using a similar structure.106 The PRC had plenty of time 
to act. It instead chose not to. As a result, the concerted silence of the PRC 
and its regulatory organs has become the norm and is read, by some, as a 
tacit form of official acceptance.107 
Tellingly, the confusion inherent in this discussion is no less palpable 
in the current practice of law. Specifically, in the run-up to the IPO, 
Alibaba’s counsel found that: 
[T]he ownership structures of our material [WFOEs] and our material 
[VIEs] . . . do not and will not violate any applicable PRC law, regulation or 
rule currently in effect; and the contractual arrangements between our material 
[WFOEs], our material [VIEs] and their respective equity holders governed by 
PRC law are valid, binding and enforceable . . . . However, Fangda Partners 
has also advised us that there are substantial uncertainties regarding the 
interpretation and application of current PRC laws, rules and regulations. 
Accordingly, the PRC regulatory authorities and PRC courts may in the future 
take a view that is contrary to the opinion of our PRC legal counsel.108 
The reality at the core of this observation has led certain 
commentators to lament that “VIEs are doomed,” recognizing that “[t]hey 
work until you need them to work and then they won’t at any point you 
need to enforce the agreement because you can’t. There’s no evidence of 
anyone successfully enforcing a VIE.”109 
II. ECONOMICS AND THE RULE OF LAW: THE QUESTION OF PROPERTY 
[P]roperty law is not a silver bullet, but it is the missing link.†† 
In contrast to the weak property right presented by the VIE, today 
there is a dominant consensus that property rights are a necessary condition 
for economic growth.110 The academy’s emphasis on the rule of law is, 
however, a recent change. Previously the dominant mode of thought was 
 
106 See Gordon G. Chang, China Can Expropriate Alibaba’s Business—And it Just Might, FORBES 
(May 11, 2014, 6:24 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonchang/2014/05/11/china-can-
expropriate-alibabas-business-and-it-just-might/ [http://perma.cc/5S7U-XUQ9]. 
107 See Roberts & Hall, supra note 13, at 4 (“Although the structure has never formally been 
blessed by any PRC regulatory body, its tacit acceptance by key regulators including MOFCOM, the 
PRC State Administration of Foreign Exchange (‘SAFE’) and MIIT has been crucial to its continued 
prevalence.”); see also ROSIER, supra note 8, at 2 (“Chinese Internet companies make no secret of their 
overseas listings, and Chinese state-run media report on them without questioning their legality under 
Chinese law.”). 
108 Alibaba Prospectus, supra note 53, at 49 (emphasis added). 
109 Oster & Lawrence, supra note 94. 
†† Clift, supra note 19, at 11. 
110 See, e.g., Kevin E. Davis, What Can the Rule of Law Variable Tell Us About Rule of Law 
Reforms?, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 141, 142 (2004) (“It is now widely accepted that markets are unlikely to 
function in the absence of bodies of contract law and systems of property rights . . . .”). 
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the Washington consensus, which “held that the best way for countries to 
grow was to ‘get the policies right.’”111 However, the “collapse” of certain 
Asian and former-Soviet economies in the 1990s112 disabused economists 
of their pure emphasis on policy, as countries that should have worked 
under the Washington model failed,113 and failed spectacularly.114 
Accordingly, scholars began to shift their focus. They instead hypothesized 
that the “institutional setting of policymaking” mattered more than they had 
previously thought.115 They were sold on the rule of law, which has 
subsequently become dogmatic in the realm of development theory.116 
A subset of rule of law advocacy that has risen to particular 
prominence in recent years—the Property Rights Nexus—hypothesizes that 
clearly delineated property rights are a necessary condition for economic 
development.117 The most prominent advocate of this particular theory is 
the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto,118 who sees property rights as 
the “tip of the iceberg” for the rule of law and, consequently, economic 
development.119 In short, de Soto believes “[i]t is the unavailability of 
 
111 Order in the Jungle, supra note 20; see also Gordon Barron, The World Bank & Rule of Law 
Reforms 2 (London Sch. of Econ. & Political Sci., Dev. Studies Inst., Working Paper No. 05-70, Dec. 
2005), http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/pdf/WP/WP70.pdf [http://perma.cc/L6NA-
UR7F] (“The World Bank’s . . . ‘discovery’ of the Rule of Law . . . and [Rule of Law] reforms in the 
early 1990s is often held to be the result of a convergence of external factors, not least the perceived 
limitations of the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ . . . .”). 
112 Order in the Jungle, supra note 20. 
113 One of the clearest examples of this phenomenon was the Asian currency collapse of 1997–
1998. See id. The crisis began with the collapse of the Thai baht. Ramon Moreno, What Caused East 
Asia’s Financial Crisis?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F. (Aug. 7, 1998), http://www.frbsf.org/economic-
research/publications/economic-letter/1998/august/what-caused-east-asia-financial-crisis/ 
[https://perma.cc/RWV4-RMMN]. The collapse caused a crisis of faith in the law and development 
world as many began to question their ability to correctly determine which policy was in fact correct. 
See Order in the Jungle, supra note 20. 
114 A uniquely bad example is that of early post-Soviet Russia. See Paul Kirby, Russia Economy: 
What is the Risk of Meltdown?, BBC NEWS (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
30492505 [https://perma.cc/6ZSJ-QWDP] (“Russians are reminded of the dark days of 1998, when 
President Boris Yeltsin’s government defaulted on its debt.”). 
115 Order in the Jungle, supra note 20. 
116 Id. (“No other single political ideal has ever achieved global endorsement . . . .”). 
117 See, e.g., Clift, supra note 19. 
118 While certainly a vocal proponent for the relationship between property rights and economic 
development, the intellectual origins of de Soto’s theory stretch back to Coase and Demsetz. See 
Upham, supra note 16, at 563 (“This focus on courts and specifically on property law has its theoretical 
origins in Ronald Coase’s ‘The Problem of Social Cost.’ . . . Demsetz built on Coase’s insights to bring 
property rights to the foreground. . . . [He] argued that the assignment and nature of property rights are 
extremely important to the performance of the market.” (footnote omitted)). 
119 Hernando de Soto, Why Capitalism Works in the West but Not Elsewhere, CATO INST., 
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/why-capitalism-works-west-not-elsewhere 
[http://perma.cc/EUX4-AU42] (originally printed in the International Herald Tribune on Jan. 5, 2001) 
(“It is an implicit legal infrastructure hidden deep within their property systems, of which ownership is 
but the tip of the iceberg.”). 
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[property rights] that explains why people who have adapted every other 
Western invention, from the paper clip to the nuclear reactor, have not been 
able to produce sufficient capital to make their domestic capitalism 
work.”120 
The logic of de Soto’s theory is simple. He believes that the primary 
impediment in the way of economic development is a lack of capital.121 He 
places the blame for this issue not on a lack of resources, but rather on the 
fact that the resources cannot be efficiently utilized—a phenomenon he 
refers to as “dead capital.”122 The reasons for dead capital’s proliferation are 
legion, although de Soto places particular blame on the inability of the poor 
to efficiently harness the resources that they currently possess.123 
Specifically, de Soto sees “houses built on land whose ownership rights are 
not adequately recorded, unincorporated businesses with undefined 
liability, [and] industries located where financiers and investors cannot see 
them.”124 Simply put, de Soto sees economic resources held in “defective 
forms.”125 This hinders the creation of a thriving marketplace and the ability 
of the population to engage with the public market.126 
Having thus located the sources of economic stagnation, not in policy, 
but rather in the lackluster delineation of ownership rights, de Soto’s 
solution is simple: emphasize and enforce property rights. Once this is 
done, “[l]egally created titles and stock certificates [will] generate 
investment; clear property records [will] guarantee credit; documents [will] 
allow people to be identified and helped; company statutes [will] pool 
resources for recovery; mortgages [will] raise money; [and] contracts [will] 
solidify commitments.”127 The unassuming truth behind this theory is the 
idea that before capital can be used for purposes of economic growth, it 
must first be officially recognized.128 
A strikingly large number of prominent economists and institutions 
emphasize a similar regime. In particular, American presidents have been 
 
120 Id. 
121 DE SOTO, supra note 22, at 5. 
122 Id. at 5–7. De Soto defines capital fairly broadly, explaining that “[c]apital is the force that 
raises the productivity of labor and creates the wealth of nations.” Id. at 5. 
123 Id. at 5–6. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 5. 
126 Id. at 6 (discussing the general value of property rights in the marketplace). 
127 de Soto, supra note 1. 
128 de Soto, supra note 119 (“To be useful in an expanded market, capital must first be represented 
in a property document where it can be assigned a status that allows it to produce additional value.”).  
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enthusiastic about the theory,129 think tanks have exclaimed “[p]rosperity 
and property rights are inextricably linked,”130 and the World Bank has 
declared that “[p]roperty rights are at the heart of the incentive structure of 
market economies.”131 The practical implication of this widespread 
acceptance has been a sustained effort to foster the growth of legal regimes 
around the world, relying on the premise that legal regimes protect and 
foster property rights. For example, by 2004 the World Bank alone 
accounted for some 600 initiatives aimed at increasing the rule of law 
globally.132 The United States government has allocated resources to similar 
programs.133 Most importantly, however, many developing economies have 




129 See, e.g., Clift, supra note 19, at 10 (describing President Bill Clinton as “a fan of de Soto’s 
work”). 
130 Gerald P. O’Driscoll Jr. & Lee Hoskins, Property Rights: The Key to Economic Development 1 
(Cato Inst., Policy Analysis No. 482, 2003), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/
pubs/pdf/pa482.pdf [http://perma.cc/HRY6-SRLL]. 
131 Upham, supra note 16, at 557 (quoting WORLD BANK, supra note 16, at 48 (1996)); see also id. 
at 569 (“Secure property rights link effort with reward, assuring all firms . . . that they will be able to 
reap the fruits of their investments; New evidence confirms how important secure property rights can 
be; [T]he more secure the rights, the faster the growth; [T]he large number of [cross-national studies of 
hundreds of legal systems] all reaching the same conclusion led one commentator to observe that the 
link between secure property rights and growth has ‘withstood an unusually large amount of scrutiny.’” 
(alterations in original) (quoting WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005: A BETTER 
INVESTMENT CLIMATE FOR EVERYONE 79–80 (2004))). 
132 Id. at 559. An additional example is the American Bar Association’s Rule of Law Initiative, 
which partners with foreign organizations to promote the rule of law. See Our Origins & Principles, 
RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/rule_of_law/about/
origin_principles.html [http://perma.cc/SJ7B-QSNP]. 
133 See, e.g., Paul Gewirtz, The U.S.-China Rule of Law Initiative, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
603, 604 (2003) (explaining an intergovernmental rule of law program that emerged under the premise 
that “[l]egal reform can enhance economic development, advance human rights, contribute to political 
reform, counter corruption, and improve China’s interactions with the international community”). 
134 See, e.g., Carl Minzner, After the Fourth Plenum: What Direction for Law in China?, CHINA 
BRIEF, Nov. 20, 2014, at 7, 7 (“On October 23, Chinese authorities concluded their annual Party 
plenum, focused on ‘ruling China according to law’ (yifa zhiguo)—the first time that top Chinese 
leaders have designated law as the central focus for the meeting.”); see also Gewirtz, supra note 133. 
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III. IMPLICATIONS 
The trouble with you Westerners, is that you’ve never got beyond that 
primitive stage you call the ‘rule of law.’ You’re all preoccupied with 
the ‘rule of law.’ China has always known that law is not enough to 
govern a society. She knew it twenty-five hundred years ago, and she 
knows it today.‡‡ 
China, and the VIE structure in particular, present a problem for the 
strong and abiding belief in the Property Rights Nexus.135 While it is 
beyond the scope of this Note to fully dispute the Property Rights Nexus, 
the VIE implicates four relevant and related conclusions. First, weak 
property rights may be sufficient in situations where they nonetheless 
provide notice of who “owns” the particular item at issue (i.e., it serves a 
title-clearing function). Second, the predictability implicit in the Property 
Rights Nexus may be achievable through the use of culturally specific, 
extralegal institutions and methods may vindicate rights in the absence of 
the rule of law. Third, predictability, an implicit purpose of the property 
rights regime, may allow for economic growth absent strong property 
rights. These three conclusions suggest that the academy has taken a good 
idea and stretched it beyond the confines of its natural universe. In other 
words, sometimes strong property rights are just one of many factors that 
might explain a particular instance of economic growth. 
A. Notice May Serve a Title-Clearing Function 
Property rights have become a one-size-fits-all solution to the issue of 
economic growth in the third world.136 Simultaneously, we have seen 
sustained economic growth through the VIE, regardless of its speculative 
ownership structure. One of the reasons for this apparent contradiction may 
be that the notice, or title-clearing, function of ownership is more important 
than the underlying property right.137 
To support this claim, a review of the foundational logic of the 
growth-through-property-rights regime is helpful. The Property Rights 
Nexus focuses on the lack of property rights for the poor of the 
underdeveloped world. The core of this argument is that economic 
development is spurred forward by freeing the populace from the burden of 
 
‡‡ William C. Jones, Trying to Understand the Current Chinese Legal System, in UNDERSTANDING 
CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM 7, 7 (C. Stephen Hu ed., 2003) (quoting JEROME ALAN COHEN, THE 
CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 4 (1968)). 
135 See supra Part II. 
136 See supra Part II. 
137 By title-clearing, I mean that the community is given notice of who can lay claim to a particular 
piece of property, regardless of the strength of that claim. 
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dead capital, which is facilitated by recognizing and codifying property 
rights.138 These rights respect the ownership structure that is already 
recognized socially, but is not fully or officially documented.139 Taking 
what is socially recognized and placing it within the realm of official 
recognition removes uncertainty and decreases transaction costs, thus 
allowing the poor to leverage their current wealth more efficiently toward 
growth.140 This creates industry, which in turn drives the economic engine 
of the nation. 
The example of the VIE supports the idea that notice may support 
economic growth, while simultaneously suggesting that the strength of the 
underlying property right of which notice is given need not be very strong. 
As we have seen, the VIE investor owns stock in a company that has 
contractual rights allowing it to control and receive the economic benefit of 
a target company. Although the ownership right is weak, the desired 
beneficiary is unambiguous—the ownership is clear. Where the VIE 
example becomes truly interesting, however, is when one considers what 
the notice actually expresses. As discussed above, the legality and 
enforceability of the VIE is suspect, creating a situation where the market is 
given notice of clear title, but an ambiguous, perhaps weak, property 
right.141 The success of this system suggests that this is perfectly tenable, 
and that the allocative function of property rights (i.e., clearing title) may 
be more important than the underlying right itself. 
B. Culturally Specific Institutions May Vindicate Rights in the 
Absence of the Rule of Law 
The function of formal law in the West—as a protector of property 
rights—may have been served by a more nuanced social system in pre-
revolution China, and a corollary system may exist in the PRC today, 
reducing the value of the Property Rights Nexus as a tool of economic 
growth. As a preliminary matter, the law of property rights as it is currently 
understood simply did not exist in ancient China.142 Society nonetheless 
 
138 See DE SOTO, supra note 22, at 6–7 (“The poor inhabitants of these nations . . . do have things, 
but they lack the process to represent their property and create capital. They have houses but not titles; 
crops but not deeds; businesses but not statutes of incorporation.”). 
139 See supra Part II. 
140 See supra Part II.  
141 See supra Section I.C. 
142 STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 11 (1999) (“The 
rule of law was alien and unknown throughout thousands of years of authoritarian rule. Concepts 
central to both contemporary Chinese and Western law, such as the creation of rights and the use of 
formal legal institutions to vindicate rights, were unknown in traditional Chinese law.”); see also 
Clarke, supra note 95 (“Unlike the legal systems of continental Europe, Chinese law does not trace its 
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prospered, creating one of the world’s great civilizations. How did this 
happen in the absence of strong law? The answer is simple: the means of 
control and vindication were extralegal.143 In the West, “early separation of 
secular and sacred authority . . . gave impetus to the notions that the state 
was founded on law and that the ruler was bound morally and often 
politically by it. [This] separation . . . is the basis of today’s distinction 
between state and society.”144 
China’s societal foundation, however, is very different.145 In particular, 
China traditionally understood that law was only one of many societal 
norms, and was generally less important than other normative value 
regimes.146 Accordingly, “positive law was meant to buttress, rather than 
supersede, the more desirable means of guiding society and was to be 
resorted to only when these other means failed to elicit appropriate 
behavior.”147 Working within this societal framework, issues of commerce 
were dealt with, whenever possible, outside the law through the ardent 
application of customary law and societal pressure.148 That is to say, 
 
roots to the private-law system of Rome or to any religious basis. Instead, traditional Chinese law 
centered on state concerns and dealt with private matters incidentally . . . . [T]he legal system functions 
to serve state interests, not to protect individual rights or to resolve disputes among individuals . . . .”); 
Herbert H. P Ma, The Chinese Concept of the Individual and the Reception of Foreign Law, 9 J. 
CHINESE L. 207, 210 (1995) (“It must be pointed out that the concept of the individual established by 
the Confucians is an ethical one. . . . This is, of course, different from the Western concept of the 
individual, which is based on personal rights and freedoms.”); RANDLE R. EDWARDS ET AL., HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 21 (1986) (“In traditional China the ideal was not individual liberty 
or equality but order and harmony, not individual independence but selflessness and cooperation, not 
the freedom of individual conscience but conformity to orthodox truth.”). 
143 See LUBMAN, supra note 142, at 11 (“The domain of activity that is regarded as ‘legal’ and the 
way it is differentiated from other domains are unique products of Western History. The Chinese 
institutions that managed state-society relations and social conflict reflect very different perceptions.”). 
144 Id. at 13. 
145 Id. (“Traditional China, by contrast, was characterized throughout its history by a remarkably 
close and enduring relationship between the state and the dominant cult . . . of Confucianism.”). 
146 Id. at 14 (“Law was but one set of norms and was inferior to principles of nature, heavenly 
reason, religious canons, ethics, and rules of propriety.”). 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 24 (“Recourse to the magistrate without prior attempts to settle disputes within groups was 
actively discouraged and sometimes, as in the case of clans and guilds, prohibited by the group’s 
internal regulations. In sum, ‘the local group generally required parties to exhaust their remedies within 
the group before looking to the magistrate for relief.’” (footnote omitted)); see also Clarke, supra note 
95 (“[L]awsuits would tend to increase to a frightful amount, if people were not afraid of the tribunals, 
and if they felt confident of always finding in them ready and perfect justice. . . . I desire, therefore, that 
those who have recourse to the tribunals should be treated without any pity, and in such a manner that 
they shall be disgusted with law, and tremble to appear before a magistrate.” (alteration in original) 
(quoting the Kangxi Emperor)). Interestingly, the absence of legal remedies continued during the Mao 
era, although in a somewhat different fashion and for somewhat different reasons. See id. (“The legal 
history of the PRC begins with the abolition in 1949 of all the laws of the predecessor state, the 
Republic of China. This left a substantial legal vacuum that ultimately had to be filled by whatever 
authoritative materials decisionmakers had at hand, including Party newspaper editorials, policy 
documents, and leaders’ speeches. At the same time, there was for many years little need for a formal 
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“practices not characterized as ‘legal’ in the West performed functions 
similar to those of some Western ‘legal’ institutions, even though they were 
not specialized or differentiated from other fields of activity in the same 
way as in the West.”149 Ultimately, the common Chinese citizen understood 
that the law did not necessarily exist to serve his interests, but was rather a 
tool of the realm in service of its stability.150 Accordingly, they learned to 
seek recourse in extralegal systems of justice. 
Interestingly, this dynamic persists.151 There is little separation 
between administrative and judicial functions.152 Cases are actively pushed 
out of the court system.153 Arbitration and mediation are emphasized.154 
Simply put, the adversarial legal process is not the primary means of 
vindicating individual rights, which largely remains a suspect concept 
within the PRC.155 
The implications of this history are two-fold. First, it suggests that 
China, in keeping with its historical roots as a society that maintained 
social and commercial order through secondary, extralegal means, may 
 
legal system in many areas of national life, since the economy was largely subject to state planning and 
conflicts could thus be resolved without reference to legal rights and duties.”). 
149 LUBMAN, supra note 142, at 33; see also JEROME ALAN COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949–1963, at 50–51 (1968) (“Indeed, Max Weber’s appraisal of the 
traditional system as ‘a type of patriarchal obliteration of the line between justice and administration’ 
would appear to apply to the Communist system.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Max Weber)); 
EDWARDS ET AL., supra note 142, at 22 (“Civil law was customary, and private disputes were resolved 
by mediation and appeal to local custom.”). 
150 EDWARDS ET AL., supra note 142, at 22 (“The ordinary Chinese person did not expect state 
protection or state law to serve causes other than the order of the realm.”). 
151 See Timothy Heath, Fourth Plennum: Implication’s for China’s Approach to International Law 
and Politics, CHINA BRIEF, Nov. 20, 2014, at 13, 14 (“The Party’s rule through law starts with its policy 
objectives. Indeed, Chinese officials routinely depict the Party’s policies and the government’s laws as 
intricately related.”). 
152 See Clarke, supra note 95. 
153 Carl Minzner, China at the Tipping Point? The Turn Against Legal Reform, 24 J. DEMOCRACY 
65, 68 (2013) (“Since the early 2000s, Chinese authorities have shifted citizen disputes away from court 
trials that are decided according to law. Judges face new pressures to resolve cases through closed-door 
mediation. Community mediation institutions dating from the era of Chairman Mao Zedong (d. 1976) 
have been dusted off and revived. New extralegal Party-led ‘coordination sessions’ have been created, 
under the rubric of mediation, to handle those cases that officials fear are most likely to generate social 
protest.”). 
154 See, e.g., Rachel E. Stern, From Dispute to Decision: Suing Polluters in China, 206 CHINA Q. 
294, 295 (2011) (“The vast majority of environmental disputes are handled through government-
brokered deals [or] private concessions . . . .”). 
155 See Hualing Fu, Mediation and the Rule of Law: The Chinese Landscape, in FORMALISATION 
AND FLEXIBILISATION IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION 108, 118 (Joachim Zekoll et al. eds., 2014) (“Despite 
the attempt to legalise social and economic life in the past 30 years, the reach of law is limited and the 
[judicial] sphere remains severely constrained. There are prevailing social norms that exist and operate 
in dispute resolution which are independent of legal norms. . . . In this sense, mediation, as practiced in 
China, may operate in the shadow of law, but, more often than not, it operates independent of, and in 
competition with, law.”). 
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have continued to rely on such mechanisms as it evolved from an agrarian 
society into a sophisticated world economic power. Identifying those 
specific structures in the modern economic arena is beyond the purview of 
this Note,156 but analogous systems have taken hold in many courts,157 the 
legislature,158 the general populous,159 and the Chinese Communist Party 
itself.160 Moreover, even as Chinese authorities have promoted the rule of 
law (yifa zhiguo), they have nonetheless called on “Party authorities to 
‘absorb the essence of Chinese legal culture’ and promote ‘traditional 
Chinese culture to increase the moral content of rule-of-law efforts.’”161 
Such statements are a clear indicator of an intention to look within for the 
answers to today’s legal questions, suggesting a possible return to 
traditional extralegal remedies. 
Second, this history implies that, even in the possible absence of 
modern extralegal regulatory structures, Chinese society has become 
accustomed to such societal mechanisms, thus creating an assumption of 
their existence even in the absence of their realization. In other words, the 
Chinese may believe that extralegal systems of justice have traditionally 
protected them and will, naturally, continue to do so in the future.162 In 
short, “China will ‘not copy foreign rule-of-law ideas or models.’”163 
 
156 For an interesting and relevant explanation of varying, socially constructed conceptions of 
property, see generally Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Property Lost in Translation, 
80 U. CHI. L. REV. 515 (2013) (exploring the concept and implications of “localized” property regimes). 
157 Minzner, supra note 153, at 68. 
158 Jerome A. Cohen, China’s New National Constitution Day: Is It Worth Celebrating?, CHINA 
BRIEF, Nov. 20, 2014, at 3, 4 (“Although the NPCSC has in recent years received hundreds of citizens’ 
complaints alleging constitutional violations and many other citizens’ proposals for constitutional 
interpretations, it has, at least formally, played the role of the reluctant dragon. It has yet to issue a 
ruling on any of these requests, preferring instead either to ignore them or to handle them via non-
transparent, informal or indirect means.”). 
159 Emily Parker, The 20-Year-Old Crime That’s Blowing Up on Chinese Social Media, NEW 
REPUBLIC (May 4, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113116/zhu-ling-attempted-murder-
case-weibo [http://perma.cc/5XF2-3U6X] (describing the netizen-sponsored vigilante justice that has 
arisen following the poisoning of Zhu Ling). 
160 Andrew Jacobs, Accused Chinese Party Members Face Harsh Discipline, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/world/asia/accused-chinese-party-members-face-harsh-
discipline.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/2VKK-QFRJ] (“When party members are 
caught breaking the rules—or even when they merely displease a superior—they can be dragged into 
the maw of an opaque Soviet-style disciplinary machine, known as ‘shuanggui,’ that features physical 
torture and brutal, sleep-deprived interrogations.”). 
161 Minzner, supra note 134, at 8. 
162 Indeed, Premier Xi Jinping has unequivocally stated, “The appropriate road and methods for 
solving China’s problems can only be found within China itself.” Id. 
163 Id. at 9. 
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C. Predictability May Lead to Foreign Investment 
A corollary, dependent explanation to culture164 is that the foreign 
investor has observed and analyzed the Chinese system and come to trust 
that it will act predictably. According to this understanding, the foreign 
investor studies China and sees a different system than the one she is 
accustomed to. But, she also recognizes that there are no mass government 
appropriations of property—at least not recently—and that the economy 
seems to function sufficiently well. The financier thus decides to invest, 
having developed trust in the fact that the system has worked, and will 
continue to do so. This trust causes an influx of capital. Capital leads to 
economic development, and prosperity is realized. 
At its core, this conception holds that perceived stability—which 
China has achieved—is sufficient for continued growth. This idea, at least 
in the China field, traces its origins to Donald C. Clarke, who argued that 
an emphasis on rights was misplaced and predictability is what matters.165 
While the core idea may be entirely sound, the VIE suggests that the level 
of predictability need not be as absolute as previous articles have 
suggested.166 In particular, there is a palpable level of uncertainty 
surrounding the legality and enforceability of the VIE structure.167 When 
read in conjunction with the amount of money that has been raised using 
the VIE structure, and the attendant economic growth that money has 
engendered, it becomes clear that the level of predictability required is 
substantially less than absolute. 
D. Property Rights May Not Be a Silver Bullet 
Understanding the effects of notice, culture, and trust on the Property 
Rights Nexus, economic development scholarship’s emphasis on property 
rights is suspect. Few will argue that strong property rights are a 
categorically negative societal occurrence. Nonetheless, given the 
contradictory information emerging regarding the ability of property rights 
to fully and completely incentivize economic growth, it makes sense to 
 
164 See supra Section III.B. 
165 Clarke, supra note 23, at 96–97 (“Where the [Property Rights Nexus] again goes too far, 
however, is in failing to distinguish between predictability and rights. Just as investment in agriculture 
depends on predictability about matters respecting which the farmer has no legal rights—for example, 
that spring will follow winter, or that seeds, if watered and fertilized, will grow—so we can imagine a 
legal system that contains no rights but that operates in a predictable manner.”). 
166 See, e.g., id. at 107 (“The Chinese example also sheds some interesting light on the question of 
whether economic development actually requires rights or simply predictability. While China’s legal 
system does not seem to protect the former very well, it may offer a reasonable degree of the latter.”). 
167 See supra Section I.C.2. 
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push for a more measured, case-specific recommendation when dealing 
with individual cases of economic stagnation.168 
IV. ADDITIONAL, FORWARD-LOOKING IMPLICATIONS 
While VIEs show that property rights may be weakened, yet still 
allow for economic development, they nonetheless suggest that property 
rights are still an important factor in the protection of any individual 
investor’s capital. Alibaba is a clear example of this reality, and the Alipay 
incident encapsulates the core issues.169 Because of the complicated 
ownership structure in which economic benefit and effective control are 
hindered by a middleman—in this case the equity shareholders who have 
their own incentives and goals—the risks inherent in the VIE ownership 
structure are greater than they need to be. These risks can result in 
economic loss when the underlying asset is tampered with, as in the case of 
Alipay and Yahoo!. Relieving the investor of this obtuse ownership 
structure would place the investor in a better position and may similarly 
affect the company as well by decreasing the possibility of ownership 
disputes, thus incentivizing further investment that might otherwise be 
viewed as hazardous. 
CONCLUSION 
A little experience often upsets a lot of theory.††† 
Weak property rights are not fatal to economic development in the 
ways that orthodox law and development theory suggests. Accordingly, 
when dealing with limited resources, a plethora of problems, and the 
pernicious reality of economic underdevelopment, governments must place 
emphasis on the solutions that will uniquely support growth in each exigent 
situation. In other words, there is a unique tool for each problem, and the 
current wholehearted academic and political emphasis on property rights is 
misguided. 
This Note has attempted to outline in detail locations where property 
rights are not as important to economic development as they have been 
previously thought. To do so, I have explained the VIE as a listing 
structure, and focused on Alibaba as a historical example. I have 
 
168 This idea has already begun to take hold in the academy. See, e.g., Trebilcock, supra note 21, at 
478 (“Rather, the relationship between property rights and development is much more complex, and a 
more nuanced approach to these issues is required.”). 
169 See supra Section I.C.2. 
††† GENNADY FAVEL, THE STOCK MARKET PHILOSOPHER 29 (2008) (quoting Samuel Parkes 
Cadman). 
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demonstrated that notice may be more important than the strength of the 
underlying property right. Moreover, I have shown that the Property Rights 
Nexus’s value may be culturally specific, and that stability may breed 
predictability, thus leading to investment in the absence of strong property 
rights. In doing so, this Note has questioned the dogmatic view of property 
rights as a cure-all for economic ills, while also exploring and highlighting 
the Property Rights Nexus’s primary points of inflection. 
My hope is that through this Note I will encourage further scholarship 
focused on China and the lessons that its recent development can teach 
about development economics. The PRC has experienced thirty years of 
sustained economic growth with little rule of law, little overt protection for 
property rights, no democracy, and fairly prevalent corruption. How did it 
do it? This is a question far beyond the confines of this Note, but it is the 
ultimate question that the VIE and its amorphous ownership structure 
suggests. I am by no means the first to push for further research, but 
previous calls have not received the answer they deserve. I offer this Note 
as an answer and an additional call for the study of China and its 
precipitous rise. 
 
